The Belt-and-Suspenders Canon by Leib, Ethan J. & Brudney, James J
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
The Belt-and-Suspenders Canon 
Ethan J. Leib 
Fordham University School of Law, ethan.leib@law.fordham.edu 
James J. Brudney 
Fordham University School of Law, jbrudney@law.fordham.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Government Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ethan J. Leib and James J. Brudney, The Belt-and-Suspenders Canon, 105 Iowa L. Rev. (2020) 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/990 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The 




THE BELT-AND-SUSPENDERS CANON 
 
Ethan J. Leib & James J. Brudney*
 
 
This Essay christens a new canon into the doctrines of statutory 
interpretation, one that can counter the too-powerful canon that 
has courts imposing norms against redundancy in their readings 
of statutes.  Judges engaging in statutory interpretation must do a 
better job of recognizing how and why legislatures choose not to 
draft with perfect parsimony.  Our Essay highlights the 
multifarious ways legislatures in federal and state governments 
self-consciously and thoughtfully – rather than regrettably and 
lazily – think about employing “belt-and-suspenders” efforts in 
their drafting practices.  We then analyze in depth courts’ 
disparate efforts to integrate a belt-and-suspenders canon into 
their thinking about anti-surplusage rules and other textual 
canons. By sketching a promising future for this new canon, we 
hope to draw judicial practice closer to legislative practice and to 
enhance the enterprise of statutory interpretation for textualists 
and intentionalists alike.  
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We aim here to christen a canon into the doctrines of statutory interpretation.  We 
propose that a “belt-and-suspenders” canon, invoked with some frequency during the 
legislative drafting process, should be recognized by judges and scholars as presumptively 
probative and at times controlling.  Two recent high profile cases – Yates v. United States1 
and Hively v. Ivy Tech2 – consider the possibility that the relevant legislatures whose work 
product was at issue wrote their statutes with features that were deliberatively duplicative, 
redundant, and/or reinforcing rather than perfectly parsimonious.3  This appreciation for 
the realities associated with legislative drafting bears a family resemblance to an older 
canon recently rediscovered by some prominent jurists: ex abundanti cautela,4 translated 
as “in an abundance of caution.” Historically more than recently, courts have recognized 
that legislatures can draft statutes to be abundantly cautious rather than to be supremely 
concise.5  Yet the idea that legislatures use belts and suspenders is ultimately in tension 
                                                 
 
1 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1096 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The presence of both § 
1519 and § 1512(c)(1) in the final Act may have reflected belt-and-suspenders caution”). 
 
2 853 F.3d 339, 344 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting McEvoy v. IEI Barge Servs, 
622 F.3d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Congress may choose a belt-and-suspenders approach 
to promote its policy objectives.”)). 
 
3 See also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2498 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Lawmakers sometimes repeat themselves – whether out of a desire to add emphasis, a 
sense of belt-and-suspenders caution, or a lawyerly penchant for doublets (aid and abet, 
cease and desist, null and void).”). 
 
4 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 140 (2001) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“the explanation for the catchall is not ejusdem generis; instead, the 
explanation for the specifics is ex abundanti cautela, abundance of caution”); Seven-Sky 
v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The lesson from 
the redundancy in these sections . . . is not to read provisions out of the statute or contrary 
to their plain meaning, as the majority opinion would have us do. Rather, we should read 
the provisions according to their terms, recognizing that Congress often wants to make 
‘double sure’—a technique so common that it has spawned its own Latin canon, ex 
abundanti cautela.”). See generally Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174, 1183 
(10th Cir. 2011) (“It may seem redundant, but if canons of construction are to be invoked, 
the appropriate one is that of ex abundanti cautela (abundance of caution), which teaches 
that Congress may on occasion repeat language in order to emphasize it.”); U.S. v. 
Bendtzen, 542 F.3d 722, 727 (9th Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 658 (5th Cir. 
2015). 
 
5 The lineage of the ex abundanti cautela canon in the U.S. traces back to some of 
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with the hoary canon that statutes ought to be presumed to contain no superfluities, a canon 
widely recognized even if subject to frequent critique.6   
                                                 
our most famous justices.  See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 115n.a (1820) 
(Marshall, C.J.); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 150–51 (1814) (Story, J., 
dissenting). For other earlier uses, see Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. 642, 663 (1823); Bank 
of Hamilton v. Dudley’s Lessee, 27 U.S. 492, 502 (1829); Manhattan Co. v. City of 
Ironwood, 74 F. 535, 540 (6th Cir. 1896) (William Howard Taft, J.); In re New Amsterdam 
Motor Co., 180 F. 943, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); In re John Liddle Cut Stone Co., 242 F. 691, 
693 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); In re Toole, 294 F. 975, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue v. Van Schaick, 82 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir 1936); Founders General 
Corporation v. Hoey, 84 F.2d 976, 978 (2d Cir. 1936). We don’t know why so many of 
these cases from S.D.N.Y. and the Second Circuit are penned by Augustus Hand.  And he 
rejects the reasoning about as often as he embraces it.   
 
Crediting a legislature’s efforts in statutory drafting to “make assurance doubly 
sure” is another somewhat outdated way of identifying the phenomenon of legislative 
repetitiveness, with courts appreciating rather than merely excoriating the reality.  See, e.g., 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Thompson, 1992 WL 26721 (N.D. Ill.); O’Neal v. O’Neal, 8 Ga. 
439 (1850); State v. Wright, 9 Wash. 96 (1854); City of St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466 
(1897); Union Trust Co. v. Ward, 100 Md. 98 (1904); People v. Frost, 12 P.2d 1096 (Cal. 
App. 1932); State v. Wills, 136 S.W. 125 (Mo. App. 1911); Shook v. Dist. of Columbia 
Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir.1998).  Courts here 
are harking back to Shakespeare.  See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 4, scene 1 
(“But yet I’ll make assurance double sure”).  And Shakespeare never really gets old.  See 
Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 2013) (crediting legislative redundancy 
over the rule against superfluities); Proffitt v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 1066, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(same); Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1014, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[L]awmakers, like 
Shakespeare characters, sometimes employ overlap or redundancy so as to remove any 
doubt and make doubly sure”); Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Burwell, 206 F.Supp.3d 93, 98 
(D.D.C. 2016) (invoking Macbeth and emphasizing that “Congress has good reason to take 
a belt-and-suspenders approach”). 
 
6 See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 574 (1995) (noting that courts 
should tend to avoid interpretations of statutes that “render[] some words altogether 
redundant”).  In a recent study, John Golden found that the rule against superfluities is 
massively popular with courts – and that other textual canons “lag far behind.” John M. 
Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 653-54 (2016). See 
also Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court's First Era: An 
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis,62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 243 & n.100 (2010) 
(acknowledging the continuing force of the rule against redundancies on the modern 
Supreme Court).  
 
For criticisms of the rule against superfluities, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 281 (1985) (“The conditions under which 
legislators work are not conducive to careful, farsighted, or parsimonious drafting. Nor 




That an individual canon can sometimes be met with a counter-canon undermining 
its persuasive force is hardly a new discovery. Karl Llewellyn’s “thrust and parry” 
elegantly mapped this dynamic, though he did not anticipate that “belt-and-suspenders” 
would do battle with “anti-surplusage.”7  A recent study of “dueling canons” also does not 
take note of this contradictory couplet of canons.8  Yet the tensions involving the two 
canons reveal a deeper strain between the legislative and judicial branches.  This Essay, by 
highlighting the popularity of a “belt-and-suspenders” approach to drafting and by 
explaining the legislative dynamics that give rise to reasonable redundancy, begins the 
project of helping courts decide when to apply what we are calling the “belt-and-
suspenders” canon, and when it might make sense to fall back on their rule against 
superfluities. 
 
In its various iterations,9 the rule against superfluities has received talismanic 
                                                 
does great care guarantee economy of language; a statute that is the product of compromise 
may contain redundant language as a by-product of the strains of the negotiating process”); 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 812 (1983) (“No one would suggest that judicial opinions or academic 
articles contain no surplusage; are these documents less carefully prepared than statutes?”); 
LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 104 (2008). See also 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 255 (1985) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (“statutory phraseology sometimes is ‘the 
consequence of a legislative accident, perhaps caused by nothing more than the unfortunate 
fact that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should.’”). 
 
7 See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). 
It is not clear why the other Latin canons like ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis, and 
expressio unius have remained at the tip of judicial tongues but ex abundanti cautela has 
mostly faded.  The sheer power of the anti-redundancy canon is evidenced in a recent study 
of judicial uses from 2000 to 2015. It was deployed around 4291 times, as compared with 
458 deployments of ejusdem generis, 296 deployments of noscitur a sociis, and 991 uses 
of expressio unius. See Golden, supra note 6, at 653 n.94 & 654 n.97. Apparently, ex 
abundanti cautela was not part of Golden’s calculus.  But the overwhelming robustness of 
anti-redundancy in statutory interpretation may explain, in part, why its natural counter-
canon has faded from view. 
 
8 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909-1006 (2016). 
 
9 What we refer to as the rule against superfluities or the anti-surplusage canon may 
be manifested in corollary framings as a rule to avoid redundancy or as a part of the “whole 
act rule.”  The logic of the rule also undergirds the presumption of meaningful variation: a 
change of wording or phrasing denotes a change of meaning.  See generally WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC 
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judicial endorsement.10 Justice Scalia (with Bryan Garner) devotes six pages of his treatise 
to justifying the canon in historical and pragmatic terms.11 Legislatures, however, have 
been less enamored.  A recent study by Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman of more than 130 
congressional staffers indicates that although almost two-thirds knew the rule against 
superfluities by name, well over half of respondents said the rule applies rarely or at most 
sometimes.12 This proportion was well below the drafters’ stated reliance on other language 
canons such as noscitur a sociis and expressio unius,13 which actually have less support in 
the courts than does the rule against superfluities.14  And in a study of state laws that codify 
canons of statutory interpretation, only 10 states reduced the anti-surplusage canon into 
their codes.15  
 
By contrast, Scalia and Garner identify the “belt-and-suspenders approach” as “ill-
conceived but lamentably common,”16 and Justice Scalia refers to ex abundanti cautela in 
comparably disparaging terms, as “a drafting imprecision venerable enough to have left its 
                                                 
POLICY 675-79 (5th ed. 2014). 
 
10 See, e.g. NLRB v. Southwest Gen., Inc., 137 S.Ct. 929, 941 (2017) (Roberts, 
C.J.) (describing superfluities as “a result we typically try to avoid”); Corley v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (Souter, J.) (referring to rule against superfluities as “one 
of the most basic interpretive canons”); Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, 566 U.S. 93, 103 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J.) (refusing to construe text “in a manner that renders it entirely 
superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
11 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 174-79 (2012).  William Eskridge’s counter-text also discusses what he calls 
the “anti-surplusage (-redundancy) canon,” though he concedes that “the premise upon 
which this canon rests is often unrealistic from the point of view of the operation of the 
legislative process outside of the drafting office.”  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 112-
14 (2016)  
 
12 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 
I, 65 STANFORD L. REV. 901, 934 (2013).  
 
13 See id. at 932. 
 
14 See Golden, supra note 6, at 653 n.94 & 654 n.97. 
 
15 See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
GEO. L.J. 341, 368 (2008).  Scott identifies Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  Id. at 415 (citing state 
statutes). 
 
16 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 177. 
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mark on legal Latin.”17  Yet at least one veteran legislator with nearly 50 years’ experience 
in state and federal legislatures, noting with satisfaction the frequency of repetition as a 
drafting technique, dismisses arguments about redundancy as in general “wholly 
unpersuasive.”18  And in the Gluck and Bressman study, drafters identify practical and 
political reasons for often favoring insertion of redundancies rather than avoidance of 
superfluities.19  
 
In pursuing a fuller understanding of the belt-and-suspenders approach, we come 
not to bury the rule against surplusage but to praise a new belt-and-suspenders canon when 
it is a rational interpretive strategy, keyed to legislative realities. Accordingly, Part I makes 
an effort to show how widespread and self-conscious belt-and-suspenders practices are 
within statutory drafting, both at the federal and state levels.  We identify two basic, and at 
times overlapping, reasons why such duplicative drafting occurs. One is out of an 
abundance of linguistic or purposive caution.  Legislatures often seek to convey 
seriousness about their terms, to forestall doubts as to the meaning of crucial words or 
phrases, or to hammer home that a clarification in text either abrogates an incongruous 
court interpretation or does not abrogate a prior law.  Earlier invocations of ex abundanti 
cautela acknowledged this reality, to be sure, but the desuetude of that canon has made 
judicial practice veer far from legislative practice. The other reason legislatures utilize belt-
and-suspenders drafting is to build consensus among lawmakers.  Sometimes using 
repetition facilitates forging compromises between bill drafters and any number of 
stakeholders who would prefer specific language in certain provisions, even if other 
provisions already cover the areas of stakeholder concern.  
 
Part II explores how some courts have interfaced with this rather common modality 
of lawmaking within legislatures.  Of course, we cannot canvass the innumerable instances 
in which courts adhere to their rule against superfluities and don’t even consider the belt-
and-suspenders counter-canon. Rather, we offer a range of case studies examining how 
courts come around to see the possibilities the belt-and-suspenders canon can suggest.  This 
Part examines a few instances where courts have been willing to acknowledge and respect 
drafting repetitions but also explores cases where courts continue to dismiss as 
unpersuasive arguments invoking such repetitions.20  
                                                 
17 Fort Stewart Schools v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 495 U.S. 641, 646 
(1990). 
 
18 See H.R. Rep. No. 107-170 on Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, at 48-
49 (Rep. Frank). 
 
19 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 12, at 934-35 (discussing why drafters “are 
often purposefully redundant to satisfy audiences other than courts”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 
20  Of course, as with any canon, the disfavoring of surplusage is not an absolute 
rule. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (“[O]ur preference for avoiding 
surplusage constructions is not absolute.”); Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 




Part III meditates on why there continues to be divergence between how legislatures 
and courts see redundant drafting practices. And then it aims to provide some guidance to 
courts for when they can stick to their guns with the old canon against superfluities – which 
is altogether too powerful in light of reasonable legislative preferences – and when they 
should embrace a legislature’s effort to fortify or bolster its statutes with belts and 
suspenders.   This task is ultimately as urgent for “textualists “who want to get the text 
right as it is for “purposivists” or “intentionalists” who want to prioritize legislative design.
 
 
I.  BELT-AND-SUSPENDERS LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 
 
 Notwithstanding lamentations from the likes of Scalia and Garner that legislatures 
are lazy or loquacious – with a penchant for alliterative couplets or triplets – our study of 
legislative practices suggests that legislatures use “belt-and-suspenders” strategies to 
accomplish principled and rational objectives.  Here we survey those strategies, examining 
this rather self-conscious legislative practice.  We discuss these strategies below using two 
basic rubrics: caution-based drafting and consensus-based drafting.
 




First, under the rubric of caution-based belt-and-suspenders drafting, legislators 
may be especially focused on textual exhaustiveness to make sure implementers get the 
message. The idea here is to reinforce the meaning or a term or provision.  Some examples 
might include authorizing an agency to order that an employer engaged in wrongdoing 
“cease and desist” from its unlawful acts;21 creating a right of action for a minor who was 
“a victim” of certain sex crimes and “suffer[ed] personal injury as a result;”22 or allowing 
a bankruptcy trustee to sell a debtor’s property “free and clear” of any other entity’s interest 
in the property.23  While these doublets might be understood as a single unit of analysis to 
convey only a single meaning, courts invoking the rule against superfluities do not always 
agree and sometimes seek to furnish independent meaning to each term.24  There may be a 
                                                 
84, 94 (2001) (suggesting that the disfavor “is sometimes offset by the canon that permits 
a court to reject words ‘as surplusage’ if ‘inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest 
of the statute’”). However, as far as canons go, this rule is very robust. See Golden, supra 
note 6, at 653-54.  So robust that its counter-canon has faded from view – until now. 
 
21  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). 
 
22 See 18 U.S.C. § 2255, discussed in Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 880-82 (6th 
Cir. 2012). 
 
23 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).  
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real irony here: legislators might well be using very recognizable doublets – such as “cease 
and desist” and “aid and abet” – precisely because they worry about negative implications 
from trying to be too concise after a doublet takes hold.25 
 
Apart from tightly formulated textual doublets, legislators sometimes draft 
redundantly in more expansive contexts within a single statute. Examples of this broader 
effort to double-cover may arise when Congress uses two separate sections of the same 
statute to make it a crime to “destroy[]  . . . a record, document or other object” with the 
intent of impeding an investigation;26 or when it defines “securities contracts” in several 
distinct yet overlapping ways as part of creating safe harbors in certain bankruptcy 
proceedings.27  
 
Even more broadly, legislatures may opt for redundant drafting in relation to 
previously enacted statutes.28 Here, they may wish to be doubly sure they have not 
abrogated prior statutory protections, prohibitions, or requirements.29 Or they may add a 
new provision to assure that the text as augmented rejects a disturbing judicial 
interpretation of the previously-enacted text.30 
 
These variations on redundant drafting share a motivational attribute: Congress or 
state legislatures are acting from an abundance of caution. Legislators repeat key terms or 
                                                 
24 See e.g. State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 2014) (construing failure to 
provide “care and support” in state child support statute), discussed infra Part II.C. 
 
25 Thanks to Aaron Bruhl for this nuance. 
 
26 This was Justice Kagan’s position about what Congress did in Yates v. United 
States; see note 1 supra and accompanying text.  
 
27 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(e) and 741(7), discussed in In Re Lehman Bros., 469 B.R. 
415, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
 
28 See, e.g., Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, 7 U.S.C. §136h(g)(3) (restricting EPA 
Administrator’s freedom to disclose certain information to foreign or multinational 
pesticide producers while also expressly providing that the criminal penalty provisions of 
18 U.S.C. §1001 apply). 
 
29 See generally United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(Scalia, J.) (reasoning that Congress sometimes includes in new laws a reference to earlier 
enacted text [such as 18 U.S.C. § 1001] “as a means of reminding those subject to the new 
laws of the self-operative, previously enacted sanctions, or as a means of clarifying for its 
own Members who voted upon the new laws the consequences of their action”) (emphasis 
added). 
 
30 See, e.g., amendment to 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(a) and 312(a), discussed infra Part I.B. 
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phrases in order to reinforce their meaning and importance, and in the process signal their 
emphasis to relevant public audiences. As part of exercising such drafting caution, 
legislators also seek to preclude any inclination by courts or agencies to take that meaning 
in a different interpretive direction. Indeed, Anglo-American common law jurisdictions 
have long recognized that legal formalism has had the effect of, in the famous words of 





Beyond the caution-based rationale, legislators also may adopt a belt-and-
suspenders approach to drafting in order to attract colleagues who are fence-sitters or 
skeptics about the bill itself.  A bill’s principal author or floor manager may believe that 
the text already covers some problem, but she will repeat the coverage once colleagues 
indicate that some kind of redundancy would increase their comfort level with the bill.  
These colleagues may come from within the legislative chamber, from a different cameral 
entity, from a different governmental branch, or even from other stakeholders in civil 
society. 
 
When drafting redundantly to achieve consensus, a bill’s author or manager may 
opt to double-cover an issue within a single sentence or subsection, or between different 
sections, or across different statutes.32 In this respect, there can be overlap between 
consensus-building and caution-based approaches. Yet the two stem from analytically 
distinct rationales. Consensus-building is externally focused: it has political and policy 
dimensions that may involve communication across a spectrum of stakeholders. By 
contrast, a double-caution approach tends to be internally focused: it is likely to stem from 
the perceptions or preferences of bill authors or legislative staff drafters, rather than from 
legislators’ dialogue in search of broader support. 
 
Given this distinction, legislative record evidence articulating belt-and-suspenders 
drafting strategies is more apt to appear in the consensus-building context. Drafters who 
are doubly cautious on their own—without being pressed by colleagues—are less likely to 
announce themselves as pursuing a belt-and-suspenders approach.  Most examples that 
follow from federal and state law involve some element of consensus-building discussion 
among legislators. Still, as noted above, the doubts expressed by fence-sitters or other 
colleagues may be attributable to textual caution as well as policy concerns. We attempt to 
convey our understanding of what underlies legislative preference for a belt-and-
suspenders approach in each instance that follows.  
 
                                                 
 
31 FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 19 (1839).  Thanks to 
Peter Strauss for reminding us of this discussion. 
 
32 We discuss examples of this approach infra Part I.B and Part I.C. 
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B.  Belt-and-Suspenders in Congress 
 
Our research has produced numerous instances of belt-and-suspenders drafting by 
Congress since the early 1990s. We offer below a set of examples that illustrate how 
common and deliberate this drafting technique is. 
 
1. When Congress needs to make sure longstanding policy does not get abrogated 
 
A bipartisan bill in the House, introduced in 2017, proposed to regulate the 
construction and maintenance of international border-crossing facilities for the import and 
export of oil, natural gas, and electricity.33 During the House’s floor debate, a bipartisan 
amendment was introduced to clarify bill language that some House members were 
concerned would abrogate the environmental review provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).34 Rep. Green, a primary sponsor of the bill and the 
amendment, referenced a CRS Report that had been introduced and discussed at a 
committee hearing on the bill; the report emphasized that nothing in the bill would take 
away applicability of NEPA requirements. Green then added that because of the expressed 
concerns of colleagues, “we will make sure it is belts and suspenders and that [NEPA] is 
applied to these pipelines.”35  During floor discussion of the amendment specifying NEPA 
applicability, Green explained: “like I said earlier, it is belts and suspenders, but sometimes 
we need them to pass legislation.”36  The amendment and the bill passed the House;37 the 
bill remains under consideration in the Senate. The floor discussion indicates self-
conscious use of belt-and-suspenders drafting for consensus-building purposes. At the 
same time, the addition of arguably unnecessary language reflects a level of policy-related 
caution, to avoid an unintended abrogation of a pre-existing statutory requirement. 
 
2. When legislators worry about conflicts among statutory schemes 
 
This omnibus piece of legislation called the Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act became law in October 2000; it included provisions that had been part of an 
earlier-introduced bill addressing states’ enforcement of their alcohol laws under the 
Twenty-First Amendment.38 During the House floor debate on the earlier bill in August 
                                                 
33 See H.R. 2883, discussed at 163 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) July 19, 2017, at H6010-
23. 
 
34 See id. at H6016, H6019.  
 
35 Id. at H6016. 
 
36 Id. at H6019 
 
37 See id. at H6020, H6023. 
 
38 See Pub. L. No. 106-386, Title VI, Miscellaneous; Division C, Miscellaneous 
Provisions; Section 2004, Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement—General Provisions, 
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1999, some legislators worried that injunctive relief authorized to prevent shipment of 
intoxicating liquor into a state in violation of state law might conflict with the then-recently 
enacted Internet Tax Freedom Act.39 In offering a bipartisan amendment to clarify that no 
such conflict existed between the House bill and the existing internet statute,40 Rep. Cox 
expressed the “hope that this is a belt-and-suspenders operation.”41 He believed the bill 
language did not disturb prior law, but saw the amendment as a re-emphasis to help bring 
at least one colleague on board. At the same time, Cox acknowledged that because certain 
states have been aggressive at taxing and regulating the internet, it was worth assuring that 
“no State confuses its power to tax or regulate alcoholic beverages with a new one found 
in this statute . . . to tax or regulate the Internet.”42 Once again, legislators’ embrace of a 
belt-and-suspenders rationale reflects an effort both to enhance support and to avoid an 
unintended alteration of a prior legal standard. 
 
3. Patent law and redundancy 
 
As explained in a House Judiciary Committee report accompanying a bill addressed 
to patentability in reexamination proceedings, this provision (ultimately enacted in 2002 as 
part of an Appropriations Act) made a small textual change to 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(a) and 
312(a) in the nation’s patent law.  It reiterated the basis for the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) to determine whether a request for re-examination of a patent should be 
granted.43 The relevant prior text addressed to reexamination procedures gave the PTO 
Director discretion “[o]n his own initiative and any time” to determine and raise substantial 
new questions of patentability.44 A circuit court decision had rejected the Office’s 
discretion when a question arose involving prior art that had been before the Office during 
                                                 
amending 22 U.S.C. §122b. Initially this provision was part of H.R. 2031, the Twenty-First 
Amendment Enforcement Act. 
 
39 47 U.S.C. § 151 note, prohibiting taxation and certain regulation of internet 
commerce. For floor discussion, see 145 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) Aug.3, 1999, at H6856, 
H6868, H6870. 
 
40 See id. at H6868, introducing amendment to provide inter alia that “Nothing in 
this Act may be construed to modify or supersede the operation of the Internet Tax Freedom 
Act.” 
 




43 See H.R. Rep. 107-120, accompanying H.R. 1886, enacted as section 13105 of 
Pub. L. No. 107-273, 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization 
Act, Nov.2, 2002. 
 
44 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 312(a). 
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an earlier examination.45 This court decision apparently led to “gaming the system” by 
patent agents and lawyers who inserted hundreds of prior art references into their 
applications, knowing that PTO examiners were required to review the applications in 
compressed time frames.46  
 
The bipartisan amendment added new text, stating that “the existence of a 
substantial new question of patentability is not precluded by the fact that a patent . . . was 
previously cited by the Office or considered by the Office.”47 As explained by the 
amendment’s principal sponsor: 
 
This is what I call a belt-and-suspenders approach. . . The goal is to 
allow re-examination of those cases where a genuine, substantial 
new question of patentability arises in light of prior art, which was 
reviewed by the Patent Office. At the same time, it leaves in place 
all of the protections for inventors . . . which exist under current law 
against frivolous or harassing conduct. While many believe the base 
text is satisfactory to meet that goal, I hope this removes any 
doubt.48 
 
One might regard this as simply an “override” amendment, given a circuit court 
holding that the committee report characterizes as “reach[ing] beyond the text of the Patent 
Act.”49 Yet, many members of the House Judiciary Committee apparently believed that 
reiterating the Office’s broad discretion through additional text made double-sure that PTO 
discretion would not be further questioned in the lower courts. 
 
Another example of “belt-and-suspenders” drafting arose in connection with 
H.R.760, introduced in 1993.  Like a predecessor bill proposed in 1991,50 it aimed to 
expand patent protections for the U.S. biotech industry.51 A House hearing on the bill made 
                                                 
45 See In Re Portola Packaging Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1997), discussed 
in H.R. Rep. 107-120 at 2. 
 
46 See H.R. Rep. 107-120 at 2. 
 
47 See Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13105 (2002). 
  
48 H.R. Rep. 107-120, at 13 (statement of Rep. Coble). 
 
49 Id. at 2. 
 
50 See H.R. 1417, Biotechnology Patent Protection Act of 1991: Hearing Before 
House Judiciary Subcommittee On Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, 
Nov.21, 1991 at 65. 
 
51 See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial 
Administration of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 760, June 9, 1993 at 1 
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clear that the drafters, acting in consultation with industry patent lawyers, adopted a self-
consciously two-pronged approach.52 Title I expanded the definition of non-obviousness 
for certain biotechnological processes in order to supersede a recent decision by the Federal 
Circuit.53 Title II made biological starting material patents enforceable at the U.S. border.54 
As explained by a leading industry witness, “[e]ither of the two prongs would solve the 
problem for the large majority of biotechnology inventions; together they would solve the 
entire problem.”55 
 
Some subcommittee members wondered whether both provisions were necessary.  
Responding to a question from Rep. Reed, the Acting PTO Commissioner stated: “It is, in 
our view, something like belts and suspenders. If one amends section 103, one doesn’t need 
the latter approach and vice versa.”56 When Reed followed up by observing “[w]hat you 
seem to be saying is that you get a lot more protection in [this] bill than perhaps might be 
necessary. But what is wrong with more protection sometimes, I guess, would be my 
response,” the PTO Acting Commissioner replied: “It is simply our view that you don’t 
need both, that is all,” 57 In a later exchange with subcommittee Chair Hughes as to which 
title he would prefer if Congress determined the protections were duplicative, the vice 
president and associate general counsel of Amgen replied that while he would choose Title 
II, “we prefer both titles [and] we feel there is nothing wrong with having belts and 
suspenders.”58 
 
In the end, the bill as drafted did not pass the House. Nonetheless, this example and 
the previous patent law illustration are consistent with John Golden’s argument that patent 
law is an especially fertile area for the operation of redundant drafting and related conflicts 
with anti-redundancy presumptions.59 Insofar as the drafting of U.S. patent law is 
                                                 
(statement of Chairman Hughes).  
 
52 See id. at 38, 44 (prepared statement of George Ebright on behalf of the Industrial 
Biotechnology Association).  
 
53 See id. at 4, 44 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 103 to overturn In re Durden, 763 F.2d 
1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 
54 See id. at 6, 44 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271). 
 
55 Id. at 44 (prepared statement of George Ebright).  
 
56 Id. at 30 (statement of Michael K. Kirk). 
  
57 Id. (exchange between Rep. Reed and Michael K. Kirk). 
 
58 Id. at 52 (exchange between Rep. Hughes and Steven M. Odre). 
 
59 See Golden, supra note 6, at 670, 673-99. 
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characterized by “relatively uncontroversial use of redundancy in institutional and process 
design,”60 it may be that traditional judicial suspicion towards redundant legal texts 
deserves special skepticism at least in the patent law context.  
 
4. When Congress internally disagrees about using belt-and-suspenders approaches 
 
H.R. 2505, passed by the House in 2001 but not the Senate, was one of many efforts 
by House majorities over more than a decade to ban human cloning.61 The House Judiciary 
Committee Report includes a transcript of the committee markup during which Reps. 
Lofgren and Conyers proposed an amendment that nothing in the Act would prohibit stem 
cell research or therapies.62 Rep. Smith opposed the amendment, arguing that it was 
unnecessary because the bill’s language did not prohibit this type of research; Rep. Lofgren 
disagreed, citing support for her concerns from the National Institute of Health.63 At this 
point in the committee markup, Rep. Barney Frank expressed deep skepticism about 
“opposing an amendment solely because it is unnecessary.”  Citing his decades of 
legislative experience, Frank observed that as politicians and lawyers, legislators are far 
from inherently opposed to repetition; indeed, they are “the profession that has given the 
world ‘belt and suspenders’” among other redundant doublets. Frank added that bills are 
hardly great literature in which unnecessary language “spoils the rhythm of the prose,” and 
that arguments about redundancy should not inhibit debate on the merits of a proposal.64  
 
Rep. Frank’s general position, that arguments against redundancy are in essence a 
                                                 
60 Id. at 699.  
 
61 The bill was reported by the Judiciary Committee on July 27, 2001; see H.R. 
Rep. 107-170. The bill passed the House four days later on July 31. Numerous other 
unsuccessful efforts to enact such a ban occurred between 1998 and 2009. See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_cloning (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).  
 
62 See H.R. Rep. 107-170 at 46 (Lofgren-Conyers amendment). 
 
63 See id. at 47-48 (exchange between Rep. Smith and Rep. Lofgren). 
 
64 See id. at 48-49. The amendment was ultimately defeated in committee by a vote 
of 18-11. See id. at 51.  We are not sure why Frank thinks lawyers created the idea of “belt-
and-suspenders.”  We were able to trace both British uses of “belt-and-braces” and 
American uses of “belt-and-suspenders” that pre-date any legal references.  See, e.g., THE 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (“belt and braces (orig. and chiefly Brit.).  Later also belt 
and suspenders.”) (citing R. MACINTOSH & M. OSTLERE, LOCAL ANALGESIA HEAD & NECK 
xvii, 131 (1955); and T.W. MCRAE, IMPACT COMPUTERS ON ACCOUNTING vi. 187 (1965)); 
Editorial, J. ED., Dec. 23, 1920, at 634 (“The president of a university is said to have likened 
a pessimist to a man who wears both a belt and suspenders and a county superintendent 
replied that an optimist is one who tries to get along without either.”); Calvin I. Ryan, It’s 
Anxiety, Not Optimism That Wins!, THE ROTARIAN 29 (1929) (“A pessimist may wear both 
belt and suspenders”); Sunday Pleads for Old Creed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1932 (same). 
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red herring, is less than fully persuasive. Superfluous language may contribute to confusion 
about textual meaning or even undermine language that seemed unambiguous prior to 
supplementation with a belt-and-suspenders amendment. For present purposes, though, 
Frank’s remarks usefully illustrate how legislators can and do have genuine bill-specific 
disagreements about (a) the value of belt-and-suspenders repetition when crafting statutory 
text; and (b) the possibility that arguments against redundancy will be used strategically to 
divert candid treatment of a proposal’s merits. Legislators are alert to the substance and 
nuance of these kinds of disagreements. But that substance and nuance may well be ignored 
or discounted if courts assume that legislatures are or should be committed to the rule 
against superfluities when drafting what might be considered redundant textual terms or 
provisions. 
 
5. When slack in the private regulatory process demands extra caution 
 
The Senate version of what became the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act 
in 2008 included a section on automatic garage door openers, mandating that all such 
openers include a protection device that did not “require contact with a person or object for 
the garage door to reverse.”65 During floor debate on the Senate bill, an amendment was 
offered to strike that section, on the ground that Congress should allow experts at the 
Underwriters Laboratories (UL) to continue to set the standard as they had done for years.66 
Senator Pryor, bill author and floor manager, opposed the amendment. He explained that 
while UL had for many years promulgated a two-part safety standard (based on either 
contact or noncontact sensors), it had recently changed to only a contact-sensor approach. 
Pryor recognized there might be something “a little bit redundant” by insisting on both 
mechanisms, but he maintained that restoring the “belt-and suspenders” approach made 
sense where safety is concerned and in light of the fact that closing garage doors had caused 
accidental deaths.67 This single-product provision was ultimately removed in conference, 
although the Conference Report included language directing the CPSC to “expeditiously 
review, revise, and consider the adoption of standards” to prevent garage-door entrapment, 
“including contact and non-contact sensors.”68   
 
This example suggests that members of Congress sometimes speak of 
“redundancy” and “belt-and-suspenders” drafting in a looser sense. The Senate here reverts 
to a prior two-pronged approach without noting that the specific statutory language of the 
                                                 
 
65 See S.2663, 110th Cong. 2d Session, §31. 
 
66 See 154 Cong. Rec. S1581-82 (amendment from Sen. DeMint). 
 
67 See id. at S1582; see also id. at S1584 (remarks of Sen. Durbin, (D. Ill.) opposing 
the amendment and citing the belt-and-suspenders justification). The amendment was later 
withdrawn without a vote.  
 
68 H.R. Rep. 110-787 (Conf.) at 75-77 (2008). The Act itself is Pub. L. No. 110-
314. 
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two prongs is not itself redundant. Still, legislative drafters defended a belt-and-suspenders 
approach as an appropriately cautionary justification in this consumer safety setting, and 
as a way to push back against slack in the private regulatory process. The strategy indicates, 
once again, that legislators are prepared to invoke redundancy as a drafting asset in varied 
settings – although legislators do often self-consciously back away from belt-and-
suspenders drafting when they feel it is counterproductive or otherwise contraindicated in 
a policy area. 
 
* * * 
 
What emerges from these federal illustrations—and they are far from 
exhaustive69—is that members of Congress are comfortable discussing and debating the 
use of belt-and-suspenders approaches to help justify various drafting choices. As we noted 
earlier, it is unsurprising that explicit references to belt-and-suspenders tend to arise in the 
context of efforts to generate consensus or solidify support. But sometimes even the 
“abundance of caution” justification is transparent in the legislative record.  Ultimately, 
these references reflect a commitment to cautious drafting and an endorsement of repetition 
in order to reinforce textual meaning or policy preferences and to reassure colleagues. In 
short, members of Congress invoke belt-and-suspenders drafting strategies with some 
frequency, based on an understanding that the approach can be valuable.  Even when it is 
controversial, it is treated as a legitimate strategy to promote caution and consensus. 
 
C.  Belt-and-Suspenders in State Legislatures  
 
Below we offer examples from two states—Connecticut and Texas—reflecting 
parallel themes to what we find in the congressional context.  These examples reinforce 
our conclusions about the ways legislatures think about belt-and-suspenders drafting 
techniques.  
 
1. When an amendment is needed for caution and consensus 
 
A 2013 Connecticut law specifies processes to assure that employees and former 
                                                 
 
69 For some other examples, see, e.g., J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout 
Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 307-12 (2010) 
(discussing how statute creating the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailout added 
several “suspenders” of protection from liability for the U.S. Treasury in addition to the 
already existing “belt” of the principle of sovereign immunity itself); Senate floor debate 
on the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act; Pub. L. No. 
112-105), 158 Cong. Rec. S1978 (remarks of Sen. Leahy); Senate floor debate on the 
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2004 (enacted in 2005 as Pub. L. No. 109-9), 
150 Cong. Rec. S11852 (remarks of Sen. Cornyn); and Senate floor debate on the 
Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995 (S.343), 141 Cong. Rec. S9673, 9677-78 
(remarks of Sens. Kyl and Levin).  
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employees can have access to their personnel files upon request.70 The text reported to the 
floor by the House Labor Committee required the employer to “permit [a] former employee 
to inspect” her personnel file within 10 business days of receiving such a request, not 
specifying whether the inspection would be in person.71 During debate in the House, a 
“friendly amendment” was offered stating that if there was no agreement on a location to 
conduct the inspection, the employer would satisfy the requirement “by mailing a copy of 
the former employee’s personnel file to the former employee” within 10 business days of 
receiving the request.72 Rep. Tercyak, the Labor Committee Chair and floor manager, 
observed that “while some of us think that this amendment is sort of like wearing 
suspenders with a belt, what the heck, we’re the Labor Committee and we’re working hard 
to bring people together.”73 The amendment was approved and the amended bill became 
law later that year.74 
 
Before Rep. Smith’s amendment, the bill did not indicate that an inspection had to 
be in person. And because this section dealt with former employees who might no longer 
reside in the vicinity, one might have inferred that in-person inspections were not routinely 
anticipated. This presumably is why Rep. Tercyak invoked the belt-and-suspenders 
analogy. That said, his decision to embrace the amendment reflects an effort to build or 
maintain consensus—an effort that was rewarded. 
 
2. When a legislature needs an exclamation point! 
 
In August 2016, when the state legislature was not in session, Connecticut was 
awarded a federal grant to launch a pilot mileage tax program so long as the state invested 
$300,000.75 The idea of a mileage tax study had been floated in 2015 at a meeting of the 
governor’s transportation finance panel (as a way to help pay for the governor’s $100 
billion transportation plan), but taxpayers and the trucking industry expressed strong 
resistance and the Senate Transportation Committee concluded that no such study was 
needed.76  
                                                 
70 Public Act No. 13-176 
 
71 See id., section 1. 
 





74 The bill as amended passed the House on May 23, and became law on October 
1, 2013. See id.   
 
75 See Connecticut Senate Transcript, May 25, 2017 (remarks of Sen. Boucher, 
Transportation Committee Chair). 
 
76 See id. (remarks of Sen. Boucher). 




There was an outcry following awareness of the 2016 federal grant, with legislators 
expressing anger about what they deemed “bureaucratic overreach” to study a tax that 
“hadn’t been debated or even authorized by the legislature.”77 The legislature then enacted 
a law making it clear that the state Department of Transportation was not authorized to 
spend any money directly or indirectly on a study, conference, or any other activity related 
to a potential mileage tax.78  Speaking in support of the proposed law, Senator Looney 
described the bill as “a reemphasis, a doubling of emphasis—it’s in effect adding 
suspenders to a belt to point out that in fact we are as a body vehemently opposed to the 
concept of a vehicle mileage tax.” 79  
 
This example does not reflect classic belt-and-suspenders drafting, inasmuch as 
there was not an initial statutory text, just a Senate Committee conclusion of rejection. Still, 
invoking the belt-and-suspenders image to support a doubling down against agency 
overreach is a reminder of how comfortable legislatures have become with the metaphor 
as well as the drafting practice.   
 
3. When state legislatures worry about impairments of core state values 
 
A 2017 Texas law, authorizing the continuation and functions of the state bar 
through August 2029, includes a provision added as an amendment during floor debate, 
directing the Texas Supreme Court to “ensure that no rule [governing admission to the 
practice of law] violates Chapter 110, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”80 That chapter 
in turn prohibits government agencies from substantially burdening a person’s free exercise 
of religion.81  Amendment supporters sought to negate the possible effect of an ABA model 
rule which they viewed as unduly expanding the definition of professional misconduct 
involving religious harassment or discrimination.82  
 
During House floor debate on an initial version of the amendment, Rep. Leach, the 
amendment sponsor, maintained that it was needed to ensure that the Texas Supreme Court 
                                                 
 
77 Id. (remarks of Sen. Suzio). 
 
78 See Public Act No. 17-174, approved July 11, 2017. 
  
79 Id. (remarks of Sen. Looney). 
 
80 Texas Senate Bill 302, § 6, “State Bar Admission and Religious Belief” adding 
sec.81.062 to the Texas Government Code. 
 
81 See Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 110.003. 
 
82 House Journal Supplement, 85th Leg. Reg. Sess., at S302 (May 15, 2017). 
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followed First Amendment precedents rather than an ABA model rule.83 When a colleague 
responded that he hoped the state supreme court would always follow the Constitution, 
Leach replied: “I would hope the same thing, Representative Turner. I’m glad we agree on 
that, but this amendment is belts and suspenders for any future supreme court that might 
be tempted to follow the American Bar Association rules which are clearly 
unconstitutional.”84 Although one suspects a degree of strategic posturing on Leach’s 
part,85 the exchange indicates that legislators are prepared to invoke belt-and-suspenders 
strategies in an effort to preempt future judicial interpretations. 
 
4. When a state legislature reveals some of its anxieties about its work product 
 
A 2011 bill in Texas added a set of informed consent requirements in order to make 
it harder to obtain an abortion in the state.86 A relatively standard severability provision 
amendment was proposed and debated on the House floor.87 Rep. Miller opined that while 
his amendment might not be necessary, its inclusion was an important backstop against 
any oversights in the bill. Rep. Farrar suggested that Miller’s express insistence on the use 
of belt-and-suspenders drafting – “Actually, I really don’t have any concerns. But it’s just 
kind of like putting on your belt and suspenders too. I want to cover all aspects”88 – 
revealed that Miller was less than fully confident in the bill as drafted. Nonetheless, the 
supposedly unnecessary severability clause was included to help preserve the rest of the 
bill and make its intent clear; the clause is part of the final bill ultimately signed by the 
Governor. 
 
* * *   
 
 These examples, like the congressional ones before them, highlight that legislatures 
self-consciously embrace belt-and-suspenders drafting – and utilize it to build consensus 
and to promote caution and clarity.  Sometimes the relevant audience for the belt-and-
suspenders approach is the judiciary; sometimes it is an agency; and sometimes it is there 
for a constituent or other stakeholder.  In all these cases, however, legislatures have 
                                                 
83 Id. 
 
84 Id. at S.303. 
 
85 When Turner asked, incredulously if Leach believed there was a risk that the 
Texas Supreme Court would look to the ABA over the U.S. Constitution, Leach replied “I 
do believe there’s a risk. Stranger things have happened . . .” Id. 
 
86 See H.B. No.15, amending section 171.002, Health and Safety Code. Sept. 1, 
2011. 
 
87 See House Journal Supplement, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess., at S76-S77 (March 3, 
2011). 
 
88 House Journal Supplement, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess., at S77. 
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rationales for what they are doing; the redundancies do not reflect laziness or an effort to 
design a neat turn of phrase with a doublet or triplet.  And these examples appear in states 
that haven’t codified the rule against surplusage (Connecticut) and those that have 
(Texas).89  Part II below explores a number of cases in which judges think about how to 




II.  BELT-AND-SUSPENDERS IN THE COURTS 
 
 Given the range of legislative examples and motivations we explored in Part I, belt-
and-suspendering does seem like a background norm and convention that qualifies as a 
canonical presumption sufficient to enter the pantheon of legitimate interpretive canons.90 
Assuming arguendo that “belt-and-suspenders” has not yet been fully declared by the 
Court to be a canon, its clear functional justifications, ample historical pedigree,91 and 
frequent invocation by justices and lower court judges, qualify it for membership even 
under rigorous entry criteria.92 Moreover, its routine competitor canon, a presumption of 
non-redundancy, lacks the bona fides of a drafting reality that we have demonstrated above 
exists across a spectrum of settings.  Although it is appropriate to recognize that the anti-
surplusage canon reflects a judicial elevation of the value of clarity, this must be integrated 
with the legislative values of caution and consensus.93  And those who keep the faith and 
spread the gospel of the canons have recognized a “principle of interrelating canons,” that 
“no canon is absolute [and] each may be overcome by the strength of differing principles 
                                                 
 
89 See Scott, supra note 15, at 415 (listing states that have enacted the rule against 
surplusage).  Both Connecticut and Texas have codified a wide variety of canons.  See id. 
at 411-26  
 
90 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 147 (1993) (referring to canons as background principles of 
interpretation that are used in statutory construction); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 65-71 (1994) (same).  For 
a more restrictive definition of what should qualify as a canon, see Anita S. Krishnakumar 
& Victoria F. Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. REV. 163, 181-90 (2018) (identifying 
as potential tests or measures the frequency of Supreme Court use; longevity of the rule; 
and justifications for the rule, while eschewing a requirement that the Court declare a 
canon’s specific existence).   
 
91 See supra notes 4-5, and accompanying text 
 
92 We refer here to the Krishnakumar and Nourse criteria cited supra at note 90. 
 
93 For an early effort to draw attention to the ways the judicial “interpretive” virtue 
of clarity in drafting stood in tension with other important “constitutive” legislative values 
of action and agreement, see Victoria A. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of 
Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002). 
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that point in other directions.”94 
 
Because courts are so familiar with the rule against superfluities and its role as a 
presumptively valid canon of interpretation, they have been slower to respond to how 
legislatures use redundancies when producing their statutes.  Yet judges are sometimes 
shaken out of their preference for (and effort to enforce) parsimony by legislators. In such 
cases, they may be willing to credit belt-and-suspenders drafting techniques, or at least 
constructively consider such possibilities.  Perhaps we can draw lessons from some of the 
times courts have engaged these issues in the federal and state courts. 
 
Below, we focus first on some relatively uncontroversial cases. We then fan out to 
harder cases in which courts appear more conflicted. In doing so, we consider how the 
more difficult cases might help courts to engage this common drafting technique in the 
future.  The easy cases may arise in the form of endorsing the relevance of belt-and-
suspenders drafting and the irrelevance of the rule against superfluities (Part II.A); 
alternatively, the easy cases can be reasonable rejections of belt-and-suspenders arguments 
in favor of the rule against superfluities (Part II.B). But sometimes the cases are just hard 
(Part II.C).  After discussing examples of all three kinds of cases, we offer observations as 
to how the presumption against surplusage might be reshaped (Part III). We do so in light 
of our findings in Part I that a belt-and-suspenders canon would reflect a common and self-
conscious drafting technique, drawing judicial practice closer to legislative practice. 
 
A.  Rejecting Anti-Redundancy Norms in Favor of Recognizing Belt-and-Suspenders 
Drafting 
 
For a clear example in the Supreme Court, consider the 9-0 decision by Justice 
Scalia in Freeman v. Quicken Loans.95  There, the Court was unwilling to try to give 
distinct meanings to the words “portion, split, or percentage” in the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (RESPA).96 RESPA provides that “[n]o person shall give and no person 
shall accept any portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the 
rendering of a real estate settlement service . . . other than for services actually 
performed.”97 But rather than employing the  “canon against surplusage,” the Court 
decided that the legislature was using a “not uncommon sort of lawyerly iteration,” finding 
it “impossible to imagine a ‘portion’ . . . or a ‘split’ that is not also a ‘percentage.’”98  The 
                                                 
 
94 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 59. 
 
95 566 U.S. 624, 635 (2012). 
 




98 Freeman, 566 U.S. at 635. 
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Court does (regrettably?) call this kind of reiteration “perhaps regrettable.”99  But 
notwithstanding its judgment that it would prefer less repetitive drafting, it seems to 
acknowledge that the reality of legislative drafting is not wholly consistent with the anti-
surplusage assumption so often enforced by courts.100 
 
 Another recent example occurred in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 
United States. v. Bronstein.101 The case stemmed from a set of pranksters who sought to 
disrupt U.S. Supreme Court proceedings, after having been warned to stay quiet by Chief 
Justice Roberts.  They were arrested under a statute which provides that “[i]t is unlawful 
to discharge a firearm, firework or explosive, set fire to a combustible, make a harangue or 
oration, or utter loud, threatening, or abusive language in the Supreme Court Building or 
grounds.” 102  Defendant Bronstein was successful in the lower court in convincing the 
judge that the words “harangue” and “oration” were unconstitutionally vague.103   
 
In rejecting the lower court’s view on appeal, the D.C. Circuit found the words to 
have a “settled meaning around public speeches,” 104 and utilized other canons of 
interpretation – noscitur a sociis and the rule that a statute’s title may provide clues – to 
reinforce the meaning of those words from other associated words in the statute.105  
Although the lower court had “viewed the convergence of ‘harangue’ and ‘oration’ on a 
single meaning as indicative of their respective vagueness,” the appellate court ultimately 
discounted the potential redundancy in the statute.106  Quoting Scalia and Garner, the court 




100 See also Ransom v. FIA Card Services, 562 U.S. 61, 81 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting, citing foreign law) (“The canon against superfluity is not a canon against 
verbosity. When a thought could have been expressed more concisely, one does not always 
have to cast about for some additional meaning to the word or phrase that could have been 
dispensed with. This has always been understood. A House of Lords opinion holds, for 
example, that in the phrase “‘in addition to and not in derogation of’” the last part adds 
nothing but emphasis. Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries, Ltd., [1942] A. C. 
601, 607.”).  Why is Scalia citing the House of Lords here, when surely there is some 
domestic statute to make the point?  Thanks to Anita Krishnakumar for the observation. 
 
101 849 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
 
102 40 U.S.C. § 6134. 
 
103 See U.S. v. Bronstein, 151 F.Supp.3d 31, 41-44 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 
104 Bronstein, 849 F.3d at 1108. 
 
105 Id. at 1108, 1109. 
 
106 Id. at 1110. 
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held that “[s]ometimes drafters do repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing 
of substance, either out of a flawed sense of style or to engage in the ill-conceived but 
lamentably common belt-and-suspenders approach.”107  Although unnecessarily adopting 
Scalia’s (and Garner’s) frustration about the recalcitrance of belt-and-suspenders drafting 
in legislatures,108 the court here recognizes and credits the technique, subordinating what 
it calls the “surplusage canon.”109  The court concludes: “When a statute’s text, context, 
and history all converge on certain terms possessing a settled legal meaning, the Court 
should effectuate it. The alternative—following a presumption of legislative precision [and 
parsimony] over the Constitution’s precipice—does not vindicate substance. It privileges 
theory.”110  Bronstein’s clarity has also productively led other courts to be more cautious 
about rote invocations of the anti-redundancy canon.111 
 
 It is not only when courts spot synonym strings that they can be willing to 
acknowledge the use of belt-and-suspenders drafting, although such strings do seem to be 
an archetype for suppressing the force of anti-redundancy norms.112  When courts spot 
overlapping subparts of bigger statutes, they can be willing to enforce a natural reading of 
a statute over trying to stay true to a pure rule against superfluities.113 They also can be 
                                                 
 
107 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 176-77 (quoted by Bronstein, 849 F.3d at 
1110). 
 
108 The court here also quotes Scalia & Garner calling the practice of “stringing out 
synonyms and near-synonyms” “retrograde.”  Id. at 179.  Notwithstanding all this name-
calling, Scalia and Garner should be commended for admitting that the anti-surplusage 
canon does commonly need to give way to what we are calling the belt-and-suspenders 
canon, which acknowledges real drafting practices.   
 




111 See Navajo Nation v. Azar, 302 F.Supp.3d 429, 439 n.7 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 
112 See also Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 881 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the civil 
remedial scheme in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 for damages for “victims” of child pornography does 
not additionally require plaintiffs to show “personal injury” because “the presumption 
against surplusage does not apply to doublets — two ways of saying the same thing that 
reinforce its meaning.”); id. (“The U.S. Code is replete with meaning-reinforcing 
redundancies: an invalid contract is “null and void”; agency action must not be “arbitrary 
and capricious”; bureaucrats send “cease and desist” letters; a bankruptcy trustee can sell 
a debtor's property “free and clear” of other interests; and so on. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 
2613; 7 U.S.C. § 13b; 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). When faced with an agency order, to use one of 
these examples, how could a citizen cease but not desist? He could not.”). 
 
113 See, e.g., McEvoy v. IEI Barge Systems, 622 F.3d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The 
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willing to see the import of belt-and-suspenders drafting even when it would conflict with 
a rigid commitment to giving effect to all meaningful variations of statutory language.114  
 
B.  Rejecting Belt-and-Suspenders Arguments 
 
These cases notwithstanding, there are also relatively easy cases where courts 
properly identify that belt-and-suspenders drafting is not a likely explanation for statutory 
language.  This reinforces that the canon can be utilized responsibly by courts – and that 
the rule against superfluities wouldn’t need to be wholesale rejected to admit belt-and-
suspenders reasoning into mainstream statutory interpretation.  
 
In Rajala v. Gardner,115 for example, a Tenth Circuit panel had to decide whether 
an allegedly fraudulently transferred asset should be considered part of a bankruptcy estate 
before it is recovered by the trustee.  If so, the asset would be covered by the automatic 
stay “of any act to obtain possession of property of the estate” triggered by a filing of a 
bankruptcy petition under section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.116  Section 541 
defines property of the estate to include, in (a)(1), “all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” and, in (a)(3), “[a]ny interest in 
property that the trustee recovers under section . . . 550” of the Code.117  In turn, section 
550 enables the trustee to recover for the estate transferred property “to the extent that a 
transfer is avoided under” provisions that give the trustee authority to avoid fraudulent 
transfers in section 548.118  The Rajala court had to decide whether allegedly fraudulently 
                                                 
fact that the different subparagraphs of § 7604(f) may overlap to a degree is no reason to 
reject the natural reading of a statute. Congress may choose a belt-and-suspenders approach 
to promote its policy objectives, and it appears that this is what it was doing when it added 
the broader provision to the statute through a later amendment. See Clean Air Act 
Amendments, Pub.L. No. 101-549, § 707 (adding subparagraph (f)(4) to the existing § 
7604(f) in 1990)”). 
 
114 Atlantic Fish Spotters Ass’n v. Evans, 321 F.3d 220, 226 (1st Cir. 2003) (“It is 
certainly plausible . . . that Congress intended the phrase ‘[n]one of the funds provided in 
this or any previous Act, or hereinafter made available to the Department of Commerce’ 
as nothing more than a particularly emphatic way of stating the stock phrase “this or any 
other act,” which appears regularly in appropriations bills. . . .  We think it not unlikely that 
Congress used the belt-and-suspenders version of this trite phrase. . . . Since the 
rudimentary phrase fails to overcome the presumption against permanence in 
appropriations bills . . . the rephrasing of it, with only inconsequential variations, should 
not be deemed to establish permanence.”). 
 
115 709 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 
116  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
 
117 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) & (a)(3). 
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transferred property is “property of the estate” under section 541(a) before that property is 
recovered under section 550(a) (thereby subject to the stay imposed by section 362(a)). 
 
The court relied on “[the] cardinal principle of statutory construction that ... if it can 
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant;” it 
deemed interpreting “§ 541(a)(1) to include fraudulently transferred property would render 
§ 541(a)(3) meaningless with respect to property recovered in a fraudulent transfer 
action.”119  Although the trustee had argued “that § 541(a)(3) is ‘a belt and suspenders,’ 
designed to ensure that assets will be available to satisfy creditor interests,” the court wasn’t 
buying it and stuck with plain meaning.120  The trustee emphasized that the belt-and-
suspenders drafting might have acted as “a deterrent to fraudulent transfers and furthers the 
bankruptcy objectives of asset preservation and equitable distribution.”121 The court 
recognized the existence of some legislative history supporting this position, but found 
contrary evidence of intent in the statute’s structure.122 In the end, the court pointed to 
many other mechanisms for safeguarding debtor assets and stuck with anti-redundancy 
norms.  Although this issue of interpretation has split the circuits,123 only the Rajala court 
considered and reasonably rejected the belt-and-suspenders argument. 
 
Another example with which anyone who studies statutory interpretation would be 
familiar is Babbitt v. Sweet Home.124  At issue there was whether the Secretary of Interior 
properly took the word “harm” in the statutory definition of the word “take” in the 
Endangered Species Act (outlawing takings) to include certain kinds of habitat 
                                                 
118 11 U.S.C. § 550(a); § 548. 
 
119 Rajala, 709 F.3d at 1038. 
 
120 Id.at 1038-39. 
 
121 Id. at 1038. 
 
122 See id. at 1039 (“Both sides present plausible arguments regarding Congress’s 
intent [contrasting H.R. Rep. No. 595 (1978) with the structure of the statute]. Therefore, 
the plain meaning of the statutory language should control.”). 
 
123 Compare Am. Nat’l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re 
MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding allegedly fraudulently 
conveyed assets to be subject to the automatic stay because one could say that the debtor 
retains “equitable interest” in the assets under a literal reading of § 541(a)(1)) with Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(holding like Rajala that because section 541(a)(3) expressly provides that estate property 
includes “[a]ny interest in property that the trustee recovers under section . . . 550,” the 
automatic stay does not apply until the transfer is avoided and recovered). 
 
124 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
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modifications that had the effect of killing or injuring wildlife.125  The statutory definition 
of “take” encompassed an exclusive list of the terms “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,” all verbs – other than “harm” – which  largely seem 
like they target direct injuries to endangered species.126  Thus, the Court had to decide 
whether the definition’s inclusion of the word “harm” added anything to that list or instead 
should be deemed to overlap substantially with the rest of its statutory neighbors. 
 
The Court could have embraced a belt-and-suspenders argument that would have 
veered close to a noscitur a sociis analysis, limiting “harm” to essentially the same kind of 
conduct otherwise covered by statutory neighbors in the definitional section. Justice Scalia 
urged this position in a vehement dissent,127 following the lower court decision for the D.C. 
Circuit.128 Instead, the Court properly preferred an anti-surplusage argument,129 giving 
“harm” new content that vindicated the Secretary of Interior’s interpretation.  Justice 
Stevens’ majority opinion, however, didn’t fetishize parsimony in its embrace of the rule 
against superfluities.  Rather, the Court relied heavily on drafting history and other signals 
of textual meaning.  Although litigants and judges did not raise the belt-and-suspenders 
canon in quite those terms, the Court convincingly rejected the gist of that kind of 
reasoning.  
 
C.  Hard Cases 
 
And then there are harder cases, where courts are internally split about the relative 
power of an anti-redundancy norm as compared with the commonsense consideration that 
legislatures draft with belt-and-suspenders techniques all the time.  Consider in this regard 
State v. Nelson from the Supreme Court of Minnesota.130  There, the court had to consider 
what to do about a state statute that criminalized a person’s failure to provide “care and 
support” to a spouse or child when legally required.131  Nelson, convicted under the statute, 
                                                 
 
125 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
 
126 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884 16 U.S.C § 1532(19). It is 
plausible to argue that harass and kill—like harm--can cover indirect or unintended 
injuries, but the focus was on the meaning of “harm” in the midst of this string of apparent 
synonyms and near-synonyms. 
 
127 Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
  
128 Sweet Home v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 
129 Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 698 (“A reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage 
supports the reasonableness of the Secretary's interpretation.”). 
 
130 842 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 2014). 
 
131 Minn. Stat. §609.375 subds. 1, 2a(1) (2012). 
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claimed that the state had not met its burden to prove that he failed to “care” for his 
children, though he conceded that he was not paying required “support.”  Somewhat 
surprisingly, the Supreme Court agreed with Nelson that the “care-and-support” statute 
required the state to show both that Nelson failed to provide care and that he failed to 
provide financial support.132   
 
Justice Stras (who has since been appointed by President Trump to the Eighth 
Circuit) found that the statute is ultimately ambiguous: the statute either could be 
criminalizing the failure to pay support and is indifferent to whether a nonpayer is also 
failing in nonmonetary care obligations; or it could be imposing criminal sanction only to 
offenders who are delinquent on both fronts.  Stras’s majority deployed many canons, 
trying to adjudicate between these two readings.  But it settled on an anti-redundancy 
preference “requiring [the court] to give meaning to every word and phrase in a statute” to 
generate the ambiguity133 and then used the “rule of lenity requir[ing the court] to resolve 
the ambiguity in the care-and-support statute in favor of the criminal defendant.”134  It is, 
perhaps, notable that Minnesota is one of ten states that have codified its rule against 
surplusage135 – and Stras cited that state statute in support of his anti-redundancy 
reading.136  
 
The dissent offered a plausible counter-reading, relying inter alia on what we would 
call the belt-and-suspenders canon.137  Citing Freeman v. Quicken Loans138 with which we 
started Part II, the dissent argued that reliance on “the presumption against surplusage is 
misplaced in this case.”139  Instead, the dissent claimed that “care and support” is a 
                                                 
 
132 Nelson, 842 N.W.2d at 435. 
 
133 Id. at 442. Relatedly, the majority emphasized that other subdivisions of the 
“care-and-support” statute used variations on the term “support” (without “care”) to refer 
to a person’s financial obligations to a spouse or child. See id. at 439. 
 
134 Id. at 444. 
 
135 See Scott, supra note 15, at 415 (citing  MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2008)). 
 
136 Nelson, 842 N.W.2d at 447 (citing  MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012), providing that 
“[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions”). 
 
137 The dissent also invoked precedent, citing over 90 years of construing the phrase 
“care and support” to mean no more than the obligation to provide financial support; as 
well as context, arguing that “care and support to a spouse or child” renders unreasonable 
a construction that imposes a legal duty “to provide psychological support and a nurturing 
environment to one’s estranged spouse.”  Id. at 446-48 (Dietzen, J., dissenting).  
 
138 566 U.S. 624, 635 (2012). 
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“doublet,” referencing a work by Bryan Garner that lists “over 100 examples of 
doublets.”140   
 
Yet Garner’s list doesn’t actually include this doublet – which raises the concern 
that the dissent is calling this language a doublet without really establishing it is one.  And 
that is the very question at issue.  The dissent’s further reliance on “the fact that Minn. Stat. 
§ 609.375, subd. 1, contains a second doublet in the phrase ‘knowingly omits and fails’”141 
seems like a non sequitur; the dissent offers no explanation for how one doublet breeds 
another (though the general point that legislatures do not use perfectly precise non-
repetitive language is virtually unassailable).   
 
We have some sympathy for the claim that “care and support” is a belt-and-
suspenders formulation.  Indeed, it seems to us likely that the dissent was correct, 
notwithstanding a codification presumptively favoring the anti-surplusage canon within the 
state’s law.  And the dissent’s view was in part vindicated by the Minnesota legislature’s 
swift override of Justice Stras’s opinion very soon after the decision.142  But Nelson 
remains a hard case because Stras is persuasive that the dissent uses a belt-and-suspenders 
argument to minimize the complexity of deciding the very thing at issue—whether support 
and care are two things or one thing.  This fact gives the lie to Scalia and Garner’s certainty 
that “when a drafter has engaged in the retrograde practice of stringing out synonyms and 
near-synonyms (e.g., transfer, assign, convey, alienate, or set over), the bad habit is so 
easily detectible that the canon [of the rule against superfluities] can be appropriately 
discounted: Alienate will not be held to mean something wholly distinct from transfer, 
convey, and assign, etc.”143  
 
Identifying doublets and the right units of analysis in statutes is not the only 
challenge that makes for hard cases. There are also difficult arguments about how belt-and-
suspenders reasoning works when comparing statutes that have seemingly meaningful 
variation.  For example, consider a debate that arose on a Tenth Circuit panel between then-
Judge Gorsuch and Judge Lucero in United States v. Smith.144  At issue was a mandatory 
minimum sentencing statute – and whether a sentencing judge is allowed to consider that 
mandatory sentence for using a gun during a crime of violence when devising an 
                                                 
139 Nelson, 842 N.W.2d at 448 (Dietzen, J., dissenting) 
 
140 Id. at 449 (citing BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL 
STYLE § 11.2(f) (2d ed. 2006)). 
 
141 Id.  
 
142 See Elizabeth Ahlin, Lawmakers Step In on Minnesota Child Support Issue, 
MINN. LAWYER, Feb. 27, 2014. 
 
143 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 179.  
 
144 756 F.3d 1179, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 2014) 
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appropriate sentence for the underlying crime of violence.  In Smith’s case, he was 
convicted of two counts of robbery145 and two counts associated with his use of a gun 
“during and in relation to” those “crime[s] of violence.”146  At sentencing, the district court 
judge, after imposing a 35-year mandatory sentence on the gun charge, was encouraged by 
the government to disregard this lengthy gun sentence as it turned to weigh the appropriate 
additional prison term for the robberies themselves. 
 
Gorsuch’s majority opinion remanded back to the sentencing court because he 
found the government’s argument unpersuasive.  Utilizing a wide range of interpretive 
canons (“specific provisions control general provisions”! “no elephants in mouseholes”! 
“watchdogs did not bark in the night!” “parsimony, not surplusage!” “meaningful 
variation!”),147 the court read 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to require the sentencing court to impose 
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences for the underlying crime of violence – but 
found no statutory command that would require the sentencing court to close its eyes to the 
gun calculation when turning to the use of traditional sentencing discretion for the 
underlying crime of violence.   
 
To reinforce its conclusion, the court looked carefully at a “statutory cousin” in 18 
U.S.C. § 1028A, which criminalizes identity theft “during and in relation to” certain other 
crimes.148  This cousin also requires that the penalties it imposes must be “in addition to 
the punishment provided for” the underlying crime and that the penalties be consecutive 
rather than concurrent.149  But the cousin also includes 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(3), a 
subsection that is explicit in its requirement that “in determining any term of imprisonment 
to be imposed for the felony during which the [identity theft occurred], a court shall not in 
any way reduce the term to be imposed for such crime so as to compensate for . . . any 
separate term of imprisonment imposed or to be imposed for a violation of this section.”150  
Gorsuch essentially argued that Congress knows precisely how to write a statute to prohibit 
sentence reductions, which is what the government claimed to be the best reading of § 
924(c). Yet Congress chose not to do it – and construing § 924(c) to accomplish this 
objective would, in effect, “render § 1028A(b)(3) superfluous.”151 
 
                                                 
 
145 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 
 
146 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
 
147 Smith, 756 F.3d at 1184. 
 
148 See id. at 1185-87. 
 
149 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a), (b)(2). 
 
150 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(3). 
 
151 Smith, 756 F.3d at 1186-87. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3380626 
30 
 
It is from this argument about the “statutory cousin” – and particularly the 
explicitness of § 1028A(b)(3) – that Judge Lucero dissented, in part:  
 
Congress may include technically unnecessary language out of an 
abundance of caution under the canon ex abundanti cautela.  Indeed, 
the legislative history of § 1028A indicates that Congress directed 
the mandatory minimum to be imposed ‘in addition to any term of 
imprisonment for the underlying offense,’ and included subsection 
(b)(3) ‘to ensure the intent of th[e] legislation is carried out.’  That 
Congress chose a belt-and-suspenders approach in one statute does 
not render suspenders alone insufficient [in another].”152   
 
By drawing upon what we are calling the belt-and-suspenders canon (and its 
historical predecessor, ex abundanti cautela), Judge Lucero tried to impress upon the court 
that the redundancy common to statutory drafting (as in § 1028A) should not be used to 
undermine more parsimonious but also effective language (as in § 924(c)) that 
accomplishes the same ends: in this instance, disabling courts from considering the 
mandatory minimum sentences when turning to impose a penalty for the underlying 
crime.153 
 
On the one hand, Lucero is surely right that the reality of drafting practices needs 
to inform how courts read statutes, especially when they are trying to divine meaning from 
“statutory cousins” and other parts of the legislative code.  At the same time, the rule that 
encourages courts to look for meaningful variation between two statutory schemes – 
especially when they are as related as they are here – also seems like a sound and reasonable 
approach to divining meaning. And yet, doubling down on a “cardinal principle” “to give 
effect . . . to every clause and word of a statute,” as Gorsuch does in Smith,154 seems 
remarkably fetishistic.  In the end, knowing when belt-and-suspenders reasoning should 
control over the rule of meaningful variation may well be as much art as science.  But it 
seems clear that turning a blind eye to the routine practice of belt-and-suspenders drafting 
in the legislature is ill-advised.  
 
Our final challenging setting involves a provision of the National Voting Rights 
Act (NVRA) that requires states to “accept and use” a federal voter registration form 
                                                 
 
152 Id. at 1196 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 108–528, at 10 (2004), reprinted in 2004 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 785–86) (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
 
153 Intriguingly, then-Judge Scalia prevailed on a similar argument two decades 
earlier. See United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 947 (DC Cir. 1985) (“Even if one thinks 
the [redundant] references were included for their operative effect, they necessarily 
establish no more than that Congress chose in some cases to make assurance doubly sure, 
but did not do so here”). 
 
154 Id. at 1187 (Gorsuch, J.) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). 
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developed by the Election Assistance Commission, although states are permitted to use 
their own form as well.155  In Gonzalez v. Arizona,156 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
had to decide whether this “accept and use” provision meant that states could not add their 
own requirements to the federal registration form.  The court held that the NVRA federal 
form set a standard from which states could not depart.157 
 
Of interest to us here is then-Chief Judge Kozinski’s concurring opinion, which 
relies on legislative history to resolve what he viewed as a textual ambiguity: whether 
“accept and use” has an exclusive rather than inclusive meaning.158 If, contrary to the 
majority, the national form could be construed as one component in the state’s 
requirements to register, the federal form could then be seen as a “belt” to which the states 
could add regulatory “suspenders.”159 Some early legislative history cut against the 
exclusive reading. Senator Ford (the bill sponsor), responding to a proposed amendment 
from Senator Simpson that would have explicitly allowed states to choose to add 
documentary requirements, described the amendment as “basically redundant” because 
nothing in the bill would preclude such state action.160  Ford did not object to what he 
regarded as a superfluous amendment, and it was unanimously agreed to in the Senate.161  
 
The House version of the bill had no such provision, however, and the Conference 
Committee adopted the House version. The Committee report explained that the Senate 
amendment was “not necessary or consistent with the purposes of this Act.” The conferees 
expressed their concern that the amendment “could be interpreted by the States to permit 
registration requirements that could effectively eliminate, or seriously interfere with, the 
mail registration program of the Act [and could] adversely affect the administration of the 
other [federal] registration programs as well.”162  Judge Kozinski concluded that “the 
conferees rejected the amendment, not because they thought it [belt-and-suspenders] 
                                                 
 
155 42 USC §§ 1973gg-2(a)(2), 1973gg-4(a)(2).  
 
156 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012) 
 
157 See id. at 398-401. 
 
158 See id. at 439-42. 
 
159 See id. at 439 (suggesting that the broad or inclusive construction “wouldn’t 
render the federal form superfluous” but instead would amount to “wearing a belt and 
suspenders”). 
 
160 139 Cong. Rec. 5099 (March 16, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Ford). 
 
161 See id. 
 
162 H.R. Rep. No. 103-166, at 23-24 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 140, 
148-49 (Conf. Rep.), quoted in Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 441.  
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redundant (as did Senator Ford) but because the inclusive meaning of ‘accept and use’ was 
inconsistent with their vision of how the Act should operate.”163 
 
* * * 
 
Part II has shown that the belt-and-suspenders canon is in modest use in courts – 
but our findings here help get clearer about how courts are able to best make use of this 
interpretative tool.  To be sure, Part I finds more widespread use of belt-and-suspenders 
drafting than seems to be reflected in judicial understanding.  This begs for some analysis 
about why there is divergence between what legislatures are doing and judicial 
understanding of that activity, and also invites some observations and recommendations 
for best practices with this interpretive canon going forward. 
 
 
III.  ANALYZING BELT-AND-SUSPENDERS  
 
 Here we bring the strands of our investigations together to offer some ruminations 
about both the legislative drafting technique and the inchoate canon in the courts, where 
judges are starting to acknowledge drafting realities.  First we reflect on what explains the 
continuing and stubborn divergence between the centrality of belt-and-suspenders drafting 
techniques in the legislature and its marginality as a canon of interpretation in the judiciary 
(Part III.A).  We then we turn to what we imagine to be a better future for the canon (Part 
III.B). 
 
A.  Continuing Legislative-Judicial Divergence 
 
There seems to be a core reason that explains the continuing divergence between 
courts and legislatures in this space: legislatures and courts have different primary 
audiences.  Legislatures see themselves as working together to convince one another and 
stakeholders to embrace important policy objectives (what we have called in Part I a 
“consensus-based” technique), and also talking to judges and agencies to make “double 
                                                 
 
163 677 F.3d at 441. Kozinski went on to explain that in both chambers, a small 
number of legislators objected to the elimination of the Simpson amendment as 
encouraging voter fraud, but their arguments were rebuffed by the majority. Id. 
 
The prospects for a belt-and-suspenders approach to another provision of the 
NVRA—addressing the process of removing voters from the rolls—appears to have fared 
better.  Although the Sixth Circuit had rejected the State’s argument that one section of the 
Act represented a “belt and suspenders” provision, “explain[ing] what was allowed and 
what was prohibited by describing both sides of the same coin,” the Supreme Court sided 
with the State, albeit without embracing belt-and-suspenders language. Compare A. Philip 
Randolph Institute v. Husted, 838 F.3d 699, 709-10 (6th Cir. 2016) with Husted v. A. Philip 
Randolph Institute, 138 S.Ct. 1833, ____ (2018). 
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sure” their policy objectives are met (what we have called in Part I a “caution-based” 
technique).  By contrast, judges view themselves as rule-of-law promoters in the service of 
lawyers and ordinary folk. This role calls upon courts to interpret enacted text to be as 
meticulously clear as possible. It is thus not especially surprising that a culture clash of 
sorts has created a tension between legislatures and courts. 
 
In striving for clarity, however reasonable in the abstract, courts too often see 
themselves as involved in the process of chastening and chastising their statutory bosses to 
write in more meticulously clear terms.164  Consider Scalia (with Garner, again) here: 
“Statutes should be carefully drafted, and encouraging courts to ignore sloppily inserted 
words results in legislative freeriding and increasingly slipshod drafting.  Nothing should 
be included in a legal instrument ‘for no good reason at all.’”165  And they double-down: 
“if the legislators themselves are not mindful of ferreting out words and phrases that 
contribute nothing to meaning, they ought to hire eagle-eyed editors who are.”166  Although 
Scalia and Garner obviously can’t speak for all judges, we suspect they are giving 
expression to why judges remain more hostile to belt-and-suspenders legislative techniques 
than we believe they should be, given its prominence in legislative practice.  Indeed, many 
of the cases we examined that consider the canon ultimately refer back to Scalia and 
Garner, quoting their language that finds this drafting technique “flawed,”167 “ill-
conceived,”168 “lamentable,”169 “retrograde,”170 a “bad habit.”171  Yet if the legislature has 
rationales for this behavior that do not stem from sloppiness, it is hard to see why we should 
promote judicial supremacy in this domain, allowing the judiciary to lecture the legislature 
about how the latter should pursue—or compromise over—policy objectives as part of a 
complex and pressured lawmaking process.  Indeed, belt-and-suspenders drafting can also 
itself be directly responsive to judicial efforts to demand clarity – repetition is one routine 
modality of emphasis – so it is ironic that legislative responsiveness to signals demanding 
clarity can too easily be ignored if the courts continue to press their anti-redundancy norm 
                                                 
 
164 For an argument that courts should be more regularly “subservien[t] . . . to 
legislative instruction,” see Peter L. Strauss, Statutes That Are Not Static: The Case of the 
APA, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 767, 777 (2005). 
 










170 Id. at 179. 
 
171 Id. 
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against the belt-and-suspenders reality of legislative practice.  
 
As we developed in Part I, legislatures are rather self-conscious and thoughtful 
about their belting-and-suspendering.  They use this drafting technique as part of their 
communicative enterprise, as they deliberate internally and communicate externally.  
When judges seek to take this strategy away through a baroque effort to demand parsimony, 
they are derogating from the project of interpretation, which should be, centrally, making 
a good faith effort to implement what the democratically elected statutory bosses enact. 
They are also being insensitive to the hard work it takes to set democratic policy in motion.  
Even largely textualist jurists like Kavanaugh and Kozinski have warmed to the idea that 
judges need to be more respectful of how legislatures actually function and do their 
work.172  We hope that in exposing some of the details and nuances associated with the 
belt-and-suspenders drafting technique, there will be broader respect for the application of 
a belt-and-suspenders canon going forward.  
 
B.  The Future for a Belt-and-Suspenders Canon 
 
The future for the canon, we suspect, will be a net softening of the rule against 
superfluities.  The canon is too well-entrenched and powerful to disappear completely, 
though we’d probably encourage the ten states that have enacted some version of the anti-
redundancy norm either to repeal it or to add a belt-and-suspenders proviso in their codes. 
But the more courts get comfortable with legislative realities associated with belt-and-
suspenders drafting, the more we can reasonably expect a mitigation of the too-often-
deployed anti-redundancy norm, which is effectively a product of judicial invention rather 
than of legislative preference estimation.  Our exploration of the comfort level courts have 
shown with accepting and rejecting a belt-and-suspenders canon reinforces the conclusion 
that it can be applied in responsible ways.  Yet having wrestled with some harder cases in 
Part II, we offer a few specific observations toward more principled use in cases to come. 
 
First, the belt-and-suspenders canon needs to be foregrounded, not treated as a 
least-best alternative.  As we have suggested, belting-and-suspendering isn’t, in the average 
case, sloppy, lazy, or regrettable.  Accordingly, judges need to stop talking that way and 
need to be ready to consider legislative dynamics of caution and consensus potentially 
before they resort to anti-surplusage norms.  Courts cannot demand clarity out of one side 
of their proverbial mouths and then stick their heads in the sand about the ways legislatures 
work to get clear. 
 
Second, one valuable approach to differentiating between belt-and-suspenders on 
the one hand and anti-surplusage on the other is to look for clues in legislative history.  Not 
every judge is comfortable with reverting to legislative history, of course. But it is worth 
                                                 
 
172 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
2118, 2122 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)); Seven-
Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 38 (2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Gonzalez v. Arizona, 
677 F.3d 383, 441 (9th Cir. 2012) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
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noting that even judges who prefer textualism might, in the kinds of cases for which canons 
become relevant, appreciate that ambiguities should trigger some resort to drafting history 
that can help clarify meaning.173  For the textualists who have exclusionary instincts about 
legislative history, however, honesty about the legislative process probably requires 
picking belt-and-suspenders readings in a larger proportion of cases over anti-surplusage 
readings, assuming there is little else to help the judge choose a reading.  Recognizing a 
belt-and-suspenders canon is not preferring intent to text, necessarily; belt-and-suspenders 
readings are also efforts to discover the communicative content of the statute.  If anything, 
anti-surplusage readings are more likely to be driven by judicial norms rather than the 
meaning of the text. 
 
To be sure, the belt-and-suspenders canon – like any canon – is not always going 
to be dispositive in producing a clear reading.  As we highlighted in our discussion of 
Nelson in Part II,174 doublets and synonym strings are some evidence of belting-and-
suspendering.  But it risks arguing by fiat to identify any two closely related words to be 
an instance of belt-and-suspenders.  Far from always being “so easily detectible” as Scalia 
and Garner suggest,175 many cases involve good arguments on both sides.  For the textualist 
set like Stras in Nelson and Gorsuch in Smith, the couplet of anti-redundancy and belt-and-
suspenders could lead to greater deployment of the rule of lenity to resolve ambiguities that 
otherwise dueling canons cannot clarify, as indeed occurred in those two cases.  This is not 
obviously a faulty ranking of the various canons.176  But for the textualists willing to do a 
little bit of peeking at legislative history, the record will sometimes help the judge choose 
between anti-surplusage and the belt-and-suspenders canon.  
 
It is high time, however, that we stop wishing for perfect drafting and do a better 
job trying to uncover whether statutory provisions are there to be caution-inducing or 
consensus-generating on the one hand, as opposed to an effort to capture different 
dimensions of a prohibition or command without surplusage.  Now that we have explored 
much of the logic generating belt-and-suspenders drafting in legislatures, we hope courts 
will extend their use of the canon, and will provide deeper arguments for when its 
application should be respected and when it should be suppressed in favor of another canon. 
 
                                                 
 
173 In his Gonzalez concurrence, 677 F.3d at 442, Judge Kozinski makes this very 
point, observing that even staunchly textualist justices might well not object to the use of 
legislative history “with equal vigor where, as here, the statutory language is in equipoise 
[between belt-and-suspenders and surplusage] and both chambers affirmatively rejected 
efforts to authorize what Arizona is seeking to do.”  
 
174 See supra text accompanying notes 130-143. 
 
175 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 179. 
 
176 For discussion about the “ordering problem” with ranking canons, see 
Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 93, at 168-74. 
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Finally, our discussion of Smith makes clear that doublets and synonym strings are 
not going to be the only area of complexity for the belt-and-suspenders canon.177  The study 
of that case highlights the care that must be taken with the canon’s application when courts 
undertake comparisons of statutes throughout the code, looking for hints about meaning by 
examining similar statutes to the one under investigation, to see how the legislature took to 
drafting in related contexts.  While being mindful of the possibility for belt-and-suspenders 
design is essential, it is also critical that courts pursue context and drafting history here, 





 As a benchmark for biblical exegesis under conditions of divine authorship, it might 
make sense to think that every word in God’s law has a distinctive meaning and that even 
a prolix legal code by an omniscient lawgiver would be fashioned to have little 
surplusage.178 But as applied to human law, drafted by dozens of people with their hands 
in the sausage-making, it remains difficult to pull from the rules of religious exegesis to 
earthly correlates.  Although this isn’t the place to argue for displacing the secular rule 
against superfluities completely, we believe we have exposed a powerful counter-canon 
that has lots of support among those who actually do the work of drafting and approving 
statutes.  With more attention to the belt-and-suspenders drafting techniques – and their 
justifications – courts engaged in statutory interpretation can hope to do better in their 
deployment of what is at present a too-powerful norm against redundancy.  
 
                                                 
 
177 See supra text accompanying notes 144-154.  
 
178 See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE TO THE PERPLEXED part 3 ch. 50 (1190); 
SANHEDRIN 99b.  Even as a principle of biblical interpretation, there is plenty of debate 
about how to think about style, doublets, and belt-and-suspenders drafting techniques in 
the Hebrew Bible.  See, e.g., https://judaism.stackexchange.com/questions/18799/are-
there-unnecessary-words-in-torah. 
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